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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002761

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/SE, AND CA/VO/L/C FOR KOTVAL

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [KPKO](#) [AU](#) [CLOK](#) [CVIS](#) [SU](#) [US](#) [UN](#)
SUBJECT: CDA HUME, MFA OFFICIAL KARTI DISCUSS PKO IN DARFUR

REF: A. STATE 159712
[1](#)B. KHARTOUM 02408
[1](#)C. KHARTOUM 02737

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: In a November 28 meeting, CDA Hume and State Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Karti discussed the way forward on peacekeeping operations in Darfur following the November 16 Addis Ababa agreement. Addressing issues such as troop levels and financing, CDA Hume encouraged the Sudanese government to see this as a moment of opportunity and urged Karti to seek a constructive resolution of the crisis. In a private aside, CDA Hume advised Karti that the USG would not issue him a visa for travel to the United States (reftels). End summary.

Moving Forward From Addis

[1](#)2. (C) On November 28, CDA Hume met State Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Karti to discuss peace-keeping in Darfur and the way forward following the High-Level Consultation on Darfur held November 16 in Addis Ababa. Karti requested the meeting to exchange views with the CDA on the Addis Ababa agreement and on the upcoming African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) meeting in Abuja. The MFA Spokesperson, MFA Deputy Director of the Americas Ambassador Abdel Rahman Sharfi, and DCM Powers attended the meeting. At the outset, Karti expressed his regret that S/E Natsios, schedule did not permit a visit to Sudan for discussions prior to or following the Addis meeting. He understood that his availability was limited but felt that a discussion would have been useful given what he perceives to be a not very large gap between his Government's and the USG's thinking on a peacekeeping force for Darfur. Karti reiterated that the Sudanese government believed that a force of 10,000 troops would be enough, but understood that the UN was seeking a force of 17,000. Given the time that it would take to get forces on the ground, he believed that the number of troops is not an issue.

[1](#)3. (C) In response, CDA Hume welcomed the opportunity to meet and briefed Karti on his November 25-27 visit to Darfur, including stops in El Fasher, Kutum, and El Geneina. He informed Karti that S/E Natsios is scheduling an early December visit, but that dates had not yet been decided. CDA Hume stated that, although U.S. and Sudanese positions differed, the USG position remains defined by UNSCR 1706. He underscored that the real task now is to focus on a way to move the process forward, emphasizing that Bashir's statements rejecting a hybrid force, as highlighted in the press and privately, were not helping this process. Karti denied the veracity of these reports.

Raising Troops

14. (C) CDA Hume emphasized that, despite the disagreement between the Sudanese government and UN position on peacekeeping forces in Darfur, the aim now must be to move forward on those points where agreement can be reached. He acknowledged the difficulty of getting even 10,000 troops on the ground in Darfur within the next six months, given the logistical challenges stemming from wells, shipment of supplies, and road conditions. He said that there is terrain for an intermediate period for troop-building and urged the Sudanese government to seize the opportunity. CDA Hume stated he had little idea what would come out of the Abuja conference.

15. (C) CDA Hume stated that the Addis meeting was highly useful, and that it helped to expand slightly the room for maneuver and discussion concerning peacekeeping forces for Darfur. It had opened a door for possible agreement, and he hoped that this door would remain open. In response, Karti stated that Addis would provide an opportunity for the UN to understand what Africans want. He repeated that any resolution coming out of the Abuja meeting would be an African resolution and, thus, not a UN resolution. He urged the UN to take advantage of any such resolution in order to understand Africa's thinking fully. Karti pondered what would be the next step or outcome if there was agreement among the Africans in Abuja on extending the AU forces for another six months. He stated that he believed that this would afford more time and make it easy for other parties to come together and talk. CDA Hume stated that the essential thing is that something be decided in this direction, and

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that the doors for discussion not be closed.

Financing

16. (C) CDA Hume noted that troop financing remained a serious issue, and that the USG continued to believe that any financing should be under the UN framework. He further expressed his concern about whether UNSG Annan would even support UN funding given what appeared to be Sudan's position on phase three. He believed that whatever position Annan takes on this issue would be persuasive for most governments.

CDA Hume underscored that troop funding remained a serious issue not only for the USG--given that the USG is currently operating under a continuing resolution--but also for Europeans who have similar budget constraints.

17. (C) Karti stated that his Government and Africa's position remains in favor of extending the mandate for AU troops. Some form of cooperation to allow troops to remain in Darfur was possible, that no one wanted a security vacuum, and that his Government was trying to find a way out of the impasse. Under the right conditions Sudan could accept up to 10,000 troops, and it had not categorically rejected the concept of a hybrid force (despite President Bashir's public statements). He said the Sudanese delegation at the Addis meeting had understood that these issues could still be discussed and even the U.S. acknowledged they would not be obligated to accept the phase-three force as described by the SYG.

Visa Revocation

18. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, CDA Hume informed Karti (alone) that we could not issue him a visa for his intended travel to the US in early December and explained the circumstances. He grumbled but took this in stride.

19. (C) Note: On November 29, 2006, Sharfi telephoned DCM Powers to inform him that the 25-mile travel restriction on the movement of Americans in Sudan had been lifted and that the MFA had been so informed. He stated that a note to this effect would be forthcoming. End note.
HUME